Loose Canons: The Devil in the Details
On November 16, 2023, the Diocese of the Upper Midwest (UMD) released a proposed set of amendments to their diocesan Canons and opened a two-week feedback period. During a brief window that spanned the Thanksgiving holiday, members of the UMD could submit feedback online provided they had time to digest the thirty pages of canonical legalese along with their turkey.
The online feedback period has now ended, but members of the UMD can still share their concerns and suggestions with the delegates that will represent them at the Diocesan Assembly on December 16. ACNAtoo previously addressed select concerns about the proposed UMD Constitution, and we now offer feedback on the Canons for the benefit of members of the UMD and interested members of the Anglican Church in North America (ACNA).
The central question is this: do the numerous proposed changes address the longstanding governance problems in the UMD — problems that directly contributed to the 2019 abuse allegations mishandling that ultimately led to the launch of ACNAtoo in 2021?
We offer this analysis in hopes of empowering the laity in the UMD and ACNA. We note differences between the UMD’s draft and the recommendations of the American Anglican Council (AAC), whose feedback the UMD sought at the beginning of their canonical revision process in 2022, where appropriate. We’ve also included sections throughout to “test” the proposed amendments by considering how they would apply in the case of Cherin’s daughter’s 2019 abuse disclosure.
Title I: Organization and Administration
Canon 1: Structure and Authority
Canon 1 concerns authority structures within the Diocese and the Province. Throughout the proposed Canons, the Standing Committee wields significant power, which is normal in some ways (the Standing Committee ought to check the power of the bishop) and problematic in others (see ACNAtoo’s previous comments on the right role of a Standing Committee). Of note here, the Standing Committee directly chooses delegates that will represent the Diocese at Provincial gatherings:
“The Diocese shall be represented in the Provincial Council and Provincial Assembly by delegates selected by the Standing Committee, subject to the requirements of the Constitution and Canons of the Province and of the Diocese.” (Title I Canon 1.4)
This method of choosing Provincial representatives is unusual and goes against the AAC’s recommendation that Provincial representatives be “elected by the Diocesan Assembly” (Title I Canon 1.4, AAC Redline Changes). UMD parishioners have long been subject to a noxious pattern of governance where a small group of leaders makes unilateral decisions on behalf of the whole diocese without synodal affirmation. Ceding the choice of who represents the Diocese on the Provincial level entirely to the Standing Committee continues that pattern.
Canon 2: Of the Synod
This proposed Canon begins: “The Synod shall be the primary legislative body of the Diocese…” (Title I Canon 2.1)
This implies that there are other legislative bodies in the Diocese besides the Synod. (The revised Constitution names the Standing Committee as one of these other legislative bodies. Click here to read why ACNAtoo believes this should be changed.) If there are other legislative bodies, why are their lawmaking processes not detailed in the Canons? If there are not, the Canons should be clarified to exclusively reserve legislative power to the duly-elected Synod.
ACNAtoo, the AAC, and Anglicans the world over agree that legislative synods are the normative way to govern a diocese and that their representative nature is key, since “in matters which touch all, all should have a voice” (The Principles of Canon Law Common to the Churches of the Anglican Communion, Principles 15.6, 18.1-2; AAC Memorandum). It is therefore important that the Canons provide sufficient detail regarding who is allowed to represent each congregation in the Synod. Membership should include clergy and lay people and facilitate a variety of voices to participate in the governance of the Diocese. Given the way power has been concentrated among the upper echelons of the UMD, new Canons especially ought to keep avenues for lay and clergy participation in the Synod open and clear.
However, the proposed Canons contain several provisions that may frustrate the representative goals of any Synod. Clergy participation is scoped in the following way (emphasis ours):
“The Clergy Delegates shall include the Bishop and any Coadjutor or Suffragan Bishops and all of the active Presbyters and Deacons under the authority of the Bishop of the Diocese; provided, however, that no member of the Clergy under ecclesiastical discipline or suspension shall be included in the Synod.” (Title I Canon 2.2.1)
The insertion of the word “active” is important, as it was not suggested by the AAC (who recommended merely “... all of the Presbyters and Deacons…” Title I Section 2, AAC Redline Changes). “Active” has a special meaning in these proposed Canons (emphasis ours):
“For the purposes of the Canons of this Diocese, ‘Active Clergy’ shall mean Clergy who: (1) regularly serve at a Congregation or who are serving in an ordained capacity within the Diocese in accordance with the approval of the Bishop; (2) regularly attend Synod meetings unless excused by the Bishop; (3) are not under Ecclesiastical discipline and (4) meet such other requirements as established by the Bishop in consultation with the Standing Committee.” (Title III Canon 2.4)
Under these Canons, it is possible for the Bishop and Standing Committee to arbitrarily establish other requirements for clergy to maintain their active status, without which they could be disenfranchised from the Synod. Without further clarification about what those other requirements may be, these Canons present a means of barring from the Synod clergy that hold views contrary to the program of the Bishop or Standing Committee.
Similarly, while it seems logical and even healthy to command that “no member of the Clergy under ecclesiastical discipline or suspension shall be included in the Synod” (Title I Canon 2.2.1), a Bishop could use his power to temporarily suspend clergy (ACNA Provincial Canons, Title IV Canon 9.1.2) to exclude dissenting clergy from the Synod. If the Bishop suspends a clergy member within 30 days of the Synod’s meeting, the clergy member does not have time to avail himself or herself of the appeal to the Archbishop guaranteed to him or her by the Provincial Canons (Title IV Canon 9.1.3).
The requirements for Lay Delegates to the Synod likewise require clarity. Does becoming a “member[...] in good standing” (Title I Canon 2.2) of a UMD Congregation require signing highly-controlling Membership Covenants that go well beyond normal Anglican standards of membership like baptism or regular reception of Holy Communion? ACNAtoo can’t independently confirm which UMD Congregations use a membership covenant, but Church of the Resurrection (Rez) does. Read more here.
Most concerning, the number of Lay Delegates from each Congregation is determined by the church’s average Sunday attendance. While this method of proportionately allocating delegates is used in some other dioceses of the ACNA, is it prudent to adopt it in the UMD? Given the size disparity between Church of the Resurrection and all other churches in the diocese, many churches will only send one Lay Delegate, whereas Rez will send seven, dominating the Synod by the interests of one group. Taken together with the fact that Missions are not entitled to any Lay Delegates of their own (against the AAC’s recommendation, Title I Canon 2.2, AAC Redline Changes), lay voices in the Synod that these Canons imagine are likely to be overwhelmed by Rez constituents.
This is particularly concerning in light of the governance culture Bp. Ruch has fostered at Rez, and subsequently the Diocese, over years. ACNAtoo has identified a pattern of the same households, sometimes cycling between spouses, dominating Rez vestry positions over past decades; a similar pattern emerged in the diocesan Bishop’s Council. We believe that the proposed changes to this Canon do not sufficiently safeguard against consolidated control.
Given the two concerns identified above—the potential for multiple legislative bodies and the Bishop’s power to place additional arbitrary requirements on clergy and laity alike as a condition for participating in Synod—we believe this Canon needs additional amending to secure responsible accountability for the Bishop and Standing Committee for the sake of the people of the UMD.
Canon 3: Of the Standing Committee
ACNAtoo has previously discussed how the Standing Committee should act as a check and balance on a Bishop’s power. Indeed, in these proposed Canons, a great deal of authority flows through the Standing Committee: they appoint representatives to Provincial gatherings, give consent for the appointments of diocesan officers, establish policies for the everyday operations of the diocese, and more (Title I Canon 3.1). But do these Canons allow for the Standing Committee to operate sufficiently independently from the Bishop, thereby truly holding the Bishop accountable? We do not think so.
The Canons detail who may serve on the Standing Committee and how they may come into their positions. Both the AAC and ACNAtoo are in agreement that, as is normative, members of a Standing Committee should be “elected by the [Synod] at its annual meeting” (Title I Canon 3.2, AAC Redline Changes). However, the proposed UMD Canons narrow the eligibility criteria further:
“The Standing Committee… shall serve as a nominating committee for Standing Committee candidates. Such nominating committee shall, at a minimum, give notice to all Congregations regarding the opportunity and time to nominate candidates for Standing Committee, determine a slate of nominees to be considered by the Synod, and conduct criminal background checks of all nominees submitted to the Synod. ” (Title I Canon 3.2)
In other words, the Synod might elect a new Standing Committee, but it’s the old Standing Committee who constrain the slate of nominees on which the Synod votes. This makes the Standing Committee a self-perpetuating body that may bar who serves on it by their ideology, alignment with the Bishop’s program, or another arbitrary characteristic. The canon mentions that the Standing Committee will consider feedback from congregants regarding nominations, but there is no provision guaranteeing that the slate of nominees the Standing Committee puts together for itself shall include only nominees that originate in the Congregations. Put simply, the Standing Committee isn’t required to implement any feedback it receives and has full authority to indirectly choose its successors in perpetuity.
Independence from the Bishop is further eroded by the Canons’ provision that “the Bishop, as the presiding officer of the Standing Committee, shall choose a Chair for the Standing Committee from among its members.” (Title I Canon 3.2)
This matters because the power wielded by the Chair is significant: he or she runs Standing Committee meetings, leads the Bishop’s annual performance review, sits on the nominating committee for the election of new bishops, gates the departure of a Congregation wishing to disassociate from the Diocese, and assesses the credibility of those who accuse clergy of disciplinary offenses (Title I Canon 3.2.2, Canon 3.1.11, Canon 7.2.3, Canon 9.6, Title IV Canon 4.1.1). A Bishop’s appointee thus wields enormous power without any meaningful input or approval from the Synod.
Bp. Ruch at Church of the Resurrection
In Anglican governance, a diocesan Bishop’s serious responsibilities are accompanied by serious authority. If the canons do not allow for a truly independent Standing Committee, there is no meaningful check on the use of that authority. We have seen from Helen Keuning’s account of her time on the Bishop’s Council that Bishop’s Council members were unwilling to challenge or correct Bp. Ruch. Do these amended Canons expose or even encourage the same vulnerabilities?
Canons 7-8: Officers and Committees of the Diocese
The proposed UMD canons provide a process for electing the diocesan Bishop, a Bishop Coadjutor (who succeeds the diocesan Bishop), or a Bishop Suffragan (who assists the diocesan Bishop with certain duties). Candidates will be selected by a Nominating Committee:
“…the Standing Committee shall appoint one (1) lay representative from each Deanery, and one (1) Deacon within the Diocese, none of whom are on the Standing Committee, to confer with the Deans and the Chair of the Standing Committee … Such group shall comprise the Bishop Nominating Committee…” (Title I Canon 7.2.3-4)
The composition of the Nominating Committee is a departure from the suggestion of the AAC, who recommend one clergy and one lay representative from each of the four deaneries (Title I Canon 5.2.2, AAC Redline Changes). The AAC’s recommendation affords more representation to the clergy in determining nominees to the office of bishop, which is appropriate since the clergy are those who will owe canonical obedience to the eventual bishop-elect.
By contrast, the UMD’s proposed process allots one clergy representative who is not already in a position of diocesan power – a single Deacon. The insufficient representation of diocesan clergy by a single Deacon may lead to the nominating committee being dominated by the Deans and Chair of the Standing Committee – all of whom serve at the pleasure of the Bishop (Title I Canon 4, Canon 3.1.2). While it is important for a broad base of interests to be represented on the Nominating Committee, since the Bishop will serve the whole Diocese, it is vital to specifically ensure more clergy representation than one Deacon can be expected to carry alone.
The UMD’s proposed Canons also depart from the AAC’s suggestions regarding the procedure to elect a bishop, particularly in the case where the Synod has not arrived at a two-thirds majority after five ballots, or at a one-half majority after three additional ballots:
“If election by majority vote is not attained within both Orders after three (3) additional votes, such nominees’ names shall be submitted to the College of Bishops for their choosing.” (Title I Canon 7.2.8)
In other words, when the Synod clearly cannot agree on any of the bishop nominees before them, there is no mechanism for rejecting them all; the ACNA College of Bishops will choose from the top two candidates. In essence, this reduces the Synod vote to a formality instead of respecting its voice: a Nominating Committee could put forward only unsuitable candidates without any consideration of whether Synod will approve of them, as a failed vote in Synod is of no consequence. Contrast this with the AAC’s recommendation that, upon five failed ballots, the Synod may choose to “reject all names,” whereupon “responsibility [would] revert…to the Bishop Nominating Committee to produce a new slate of candidates within six months” (Title I Canon 5.2.8, AAC Redline Changes).
Bishops are not the only figures of note in their dioceses. A number of other officer (e.g. Secretary, Treasurer, Registrar, etc.) and committee (Finance, Constitution and Canons, etc.) positions are enumerated in UMD’s proposed Canons. Any person appointed by the Bishop to these positions must receive the consent of the Standing Committee, which is a positive move in a normal direction when compared to UMD’s original Canons that required only the advice of the Standing Committee (UMD Constitution & Canons, Title I Canon 4). However, the actionability of this recommended change hinges on the independence of the Standing Committee from the Bishop as discussed above.
Canon 9: Of Congregations and Missions
In the aftermath of its mishandling of Mark Rivera’s sexual abuse of a child, the UMD has removed the Greenhouse Movement from its list of deaneries (Title I Canon 1). The unconventional organization of Greenhouse within the UMD resulted in confusing and overlapping lines of authority that left gaps in accountability and response when ministers in Greenhouse committed misconduct.
It is important to note that all ministry in the Diocese, even things occuring in the Greenhouse churches, was always and only under the jurisdiction of the Bishop: in Anglican polity, there is no such thing as diocesan ministry not overseen by the diocesan Bishop. The proposed UMD Canons now more clearly reflect that and more conventionally divide the Diocese’s local churches into Congregations and Missions, whose clergy are all explicitly under the Bishop’s authority. The proposed change is, on the most charitable reading, to reduce confusion about this by removing Greenhouse’s extra layer of administration. This goes a long way in moving the Diocese toward a normal model of Anglican polity, but still falls short in an important way that needs to be remedied.
Missions are church plants or related outreaches that are not full-fledged, self-supporting Congregations. The UMD proposed Canons state (emphasis ours):
“All Missions must be affiliated with a Congregation and under the exclusive supervision of such Congregation’s Rector and Vestry.“ (Title I Canon 9.2)
This sounds like a welcome corrective to the previous status quo, where church plants presented a muddled line of oversight to their congregants. After all, it is normal in Anglican polity for missions to receive clerical help from a mother parish or directly from the diocese – that is where we get the Anglican word vicar, for a priest who stands vicariously in place of the diocesan bishop at a mission until the mission can support its own rector and become a parish (a Congregation, in UMD’s language). But a close reading reveals that this new Canon still permits the same grave misunderstanding as the old arrangement: by appointing the duty not only of “supervision” but of “exclusive supervision” to a Mission’s associated Congregation’s Rector, the Canon allows the Bishop to abdicate his central episcopal duty to a Mission in his jurisdiction. This provision denies the core Anglican idea that all diocesan ministerial authority derives from the Bishop. Therefore, the Bishop is responsible for every one of the ministers in his Diocese.
It is not possible in Anglican polity for a Bishop to wash his hands of oversight of any Mission, delegating it “exclusively” to a “Congregation’s Rector and Vestry.” Supervision of – and responsibility for – all ministry in the diocese is his duty, which he cannot and must not sidestep. ACNAtoo heartily agrees with the AAC and Anglicans around the world in affirming this basic principle: the buck stops with the bishop (AAC Memorandum). UMD people unsure about whether the language of “exclusive supervision” means the innocent delegation of everyday administrative duties or a more comprehensive ceding of oversight should consider: if scandal were to break out in a Mission, would a corrupt Bishop be able to indemnify himself by pointing to this provision? Could such a Bishop say, “I have nothing to do with the governance of that place – our Canons give the Rector and Vestry of Such-and-Such Church ‘exclusive supervision,’ which excludes me”? If you think that is possible, you should advocate for this Canon to be revised.
How would/could this play out in the case of Cherin’s daughter’s abuse disclosure?
In this new structure, Christ Our Light (a Mission) would have been under the authority of another Congregation’s Rector and Vestry. It could be up to that Rector to manage all aspects of an abuse crisis in the Mission under his “exclusive supervision.” When Cherin’s daughter disclosed her abuse, Cherin brought it to her priest, who then, in the new structure, would have brought it to his overseeing Rector. According to the proposed Title IV Canon 1, the Rector bears sole responsibility for investigating and disciplining members of the laity. Mark Rivera, as a lay minister, would be under that responsibility.
Left to right: Christoper Lapeyre, Mark Rivera, Bp. Ruch, Rev. York
As written, these Canons leave serious questions about what responsibility rests on a supervising Rector and Vestry of a Mission. Will Rectors and Vestry members be functionally (or financially, or legally) shouldering responsibilities outside of their ordination vows and governing duties? Will the Bishop be protected from the responsibilities and accountability due his position? “Exclusive supervision” is ambiguous enough that, in the worst case, these proposed Canons create a firewall to protect him from abuse management – or mismanagement – rising to his level in the organization. ACNAtoo believes these new Canons set a disastrous precedent for all future Bishops and shifts the burden of episcopal responsibility onto clergy and lay people who should not be asked to bear it.
Also of concern is the entirely new procedure to be followed by a Congregation wishing to disassociate from the Diocese. The ACNA Provincial Canons guarantee the right of a Congregation to transfer from one Diocese to another (providing the Archbishop as a mediator if the Bishop(s) cannot agree with the Congregation) and the right of a Congregation to leave the ACNA altogether (ACNA Provincial Canons, Title I Canon 6.9).
But the UMD’s proposed procedure throws up numerous barriers for the Congregation wishing to depart, requiring that the Congregation petition the Diocese no fewer than three times, with each step taking an undefined length of time for the Diocese to complete; this seems contrary to the spirit, and perhaps the letter, of the ACNA Provincial Canons which only require the Congregation to “notify” their Bishop of their wishes to depart (ACNA Provincial Canons, Title I Canon 6.9).
The procedural slowdowns placed around this process in these Canons serve the Bishop’s interest at the expense of those he is elected to serve. While a Congregation must jump through hoops to depart the Diocese, the proposed Canons permit the Diocese to act summarily against a dissenting Congregation:
“The Diocese may choose to expel a Congregation by a two-thirds vote of the Standing Committee and approval by the Bishop.” (Title I Canon 9.6.3)
In other words, at any time, the Bishop and his Standing Committee –the independence of which, as we have seen, still remains in question –may kick out a Congregation at will, the Congregation having no recourse. Where are the safeguards to ensure this is done with due process?
Lastly, there is no specification that Vestries, the governing bodies of each Congregation, are to be composed of lay people, as is common in the tradition of Anglican common law, and no guarantee that Vestry members actually come from the Congregations they are representing (emphasis ours):
“Each member of the Vestry shall be (1) a communicant and member in good standing in a Congregation of the Diocese…” (Title I Canon 9.8.5)
These oversights are easily correctable and must be remedied to ensure proper representation of the Congregation by the Vestry.
How would/could this play out in the case of Cherin’s daughter’s abuse disclosure?
If abuse were disclosed in a UMD Mission, the Bishop and Standing Committee could immediately expel the Mission’s mother Congregation before, during, or after an investigation overseen by the Rector took place. This kind of precarity might further motivate Rectors to not disclose abuse to the proper authorities and have a chilling effect on those who would report; the possibility of the whole church being expelled because one person came forward to report is severe.
On the other hand, if a church finds an aspect of diocesan leadership unlawful or out of keeping with Anglican norms, they risk expulsion if they bring it up at the diocese level. This places an enormous burden, again, on Rectors, to be both the fall-guy and the firewall for the Bishop’s possible mismanagement. In the case of an abuse disclosure, it is easier for a church in which abuse is exposed to be expelled from the UMD than for an investigation to be properly administered.
Title III: Of Ministers
Under the proposed Canons, the Congregation (with its Rector and parishioners) is the primary place of discernment for ordinands. This canonical revision is more aligned with Anglican norms than the previous ordination process, which was severely lacking. We are glad the AAC has weighed in to attempt to prevent any further abuse in the ordination process, especially by recommending criminal and sexual abuse background checks at this level.
Whether those background checks will be a meaningful barrier to ordination is still an open question. They weren’t in the case of Joshua Moon, who was caught in a prostitution sting before Bp. Ruch ordained him to ministry. Christopher Lapeyre was able to continue ministry in Christ our Light and at Church of the Resurrection despite losing his high school teaching job for grooming a minor student. If UMD continues to foster a culture where men with criminal backgrounds can be “healed” and ordained, it is likely the institution of background checks will simply give the people of the UMD a false sense of security.
How would/could this play out in the case of Cherin’s daughter’s abuse disclosure?
While the position of Lay Catechist is not mentioned in the proposed canons, it is unclear whether UMD churches will continue to offer that ministry role or not. In any case, ACNAtoo finds it troubling that the Canons fail to reckon with the concept of community grooming in a way that clearly prioritizes abuse prevention and proper response to disclosures. It is good that more local involvement might come to bear on ordination discernment, but that is far from sufficient. Given the astounding lack of judgment Bp. Ruch displayed in ordaining Joshua Moon to the priesthood despite knowledge of his crime, there is a deeper cultural issue that ACNAtoo believes will not be remedied by these proposed changes to vetting ordinands.
Conclusion
The UMD released these proposed Canons with a two-week comment window over a major U.S. holiday. This behavior is consistent with tactics designed to prevent significant input and criticism. When a diocese releases important documents late at night, provides feedback periods the average person can’t meet, and floods parishioners with multiple documents that require comparative reading to comprehend, it is irresponsible and inconsiderate diocesan governance. Given that these proposed Canons don’t place proper checks and balances on the bishop’s power, the UMD’s actions appear to be an intentional move to push through proposals that maintain a dysfunctional and dangerous status quo.
You can read ACNAtoo’s analysis of Title IV of the proposed Canons here.